For some time I have reflected on the Utopian pseudo-Christian Evangelical Nature and Attitude of the Leftist, the Activist Class, and the general Egalitarian Mind; and I have come to certain conclusions about them, both immediately, slowly and again immediately, as my emotions have caught up with my reason, and my reason has backtracked again to be in greater synchronization with my emotions over the past 8-12 years.
First, Leftists do start from seizing on some general problems and some specific problems historically, but their motivations, origins and beliefs are never coherent, but are in fact drawn from various places, regardless of scientific pretensions or ideals.
Second, they absolutely operate from a “Churchey” and Proselytizing Propositional Gotcha Mind; which in the past I have found much more discombobulating that the more obvious duplicities of a highly race-conscious ethnic type who is much more clearly just echoing Liberal-Anglo-Saxon Values of liberty for the sake of their own personal and careerist benefit. The Leftist, really did and does still to some extent, have a genuine “GRAND VISION” of society. The core “White” and perhaps Jewish, and other hangers on, really DO think that an Egalitarian society can be built without the functional equivalents of Priests and Kings.
Of course I think this is irrational and nonsensical. I think there will always be “gods” even if you change the name and the label.
Third, Leftist movements won, only where the Apocalyptic Mind merged completely and opportunistically with exactly the right political-material conditions. It lost fantastically, everywhere those conditions did not exist, and where their Apocalyptic Mind was the least concentrated.
Contrariwise Rightist and even Far-Right movements or even Social-Democratic movements ( Modern Denmark ) which simply preempt and coop Far-Right talking-points can win almost instantly, sometimes with an Apocalyptic Mind ( Hitler ) and sometimes without one. ( Lee Kuan Yew )
Examples, they “won” in Russia and China, but failed miserably in Germany and England. They fail miserably in Britain and the United States to this day for more complicated reasons.
Nevertheless, there is something about Conspiratorial Thinking, and its transformations and iterations over time, that is worth studying ( I think ) as a teaching tool for history. For example, it is almost a truism, that Conspiratorial Elites usually eliminate themselves shortly after taking power, and this happens in both Liberal Revolutions and so-called “Leftist” ones as well.
The Ritual Dimension: Why It Feels Theological
It is also frequently observed whether in the Monty Python skit “Judean Peoples Front” or even modern Far-Leftoid parties, that Leftists seem to play out on almost Theological 5-Act play, when they are out of power for more than 10 years; and that the real purpose of such “Vanguardism” is not really to function as a “party” but more as secular “Churches” for the aged and the resentful, with Theory and Analysis and Current Politics functioning kind of like a combination between a Bible and a Divine Liturgy. The “Fascist” is for them a kind of anti-Christ, and any Rightist figure, such as a Trump, plays the role assigned to him; within certain boundaries of their Bible.
Of course, some ultra-nationalist groups can behave like this too, but Leftism has a more prolific and open number of Leninist “Churches” that it just feels easier to more consistently pair them side by side for observations; even if it some new group that calls itself the “American Party of Labor” for example. In each case, if such a group has existed for over 10 years, I think it will always play out the same theological pattern, and will have a high-turnover rate of Priests and Sinners.
The Two “Lenin Churches”
1903–1910 First Lenin Church Small faction, underground work, ideological discipline tested, high turnover**~7 years**
1912–1917 Second Lenin Church Reorganized Bolsheviks, tighter centralization, focused on revolutionary preparation, minor splits controlled**~5–7 years**
Revolutionary leftist movements tend to fracture early and repeatedly because of a combination of doctrinal, moral, and organizational pressures. Doctrinal absolutism makes disagreement appear not as legitimate debate but as error or betrayal, so even minor differences are labeled “revisionism” or deviation.
The moral intensity of egalitarian belief amplifies this effect: in groups built around justice and equality, members constantly monitor each other for signs of impurity, denouncing those who fail to meet the ideological standard. Organizational insecurity in small conspiratorial cells compounds the problem, as fear of infiltration or failure turns suspicion into a survival reflex. Finally, the Leninist inheritance entrenched the expectation that cadres operate with rigid discipline and ideological rectitude.
Beyond structure, these behaviors acquire a ritualistic quality, functioning like a moral liturgy of purification. Confession and self-criticism, from Stalin’s show trials to Maoist struggle sessions, serve to reaffirm the group’s unity and commitment. Heresiology mirrors medieval religious practices, defining the community by identifying and condemning deviations. Denunciation, whether of others or oneself, becomes a symbolic act of faith, a demonstration of loyalty and righteousness.
Even without state power, leftist collectives can reenact this drama because it provides cohesion, meaning, and catharsis. It is less a matter of premeditated cruelty than a social mechanism for maintaining shared belief under stress.
The Iterations of Leftist churches
The Communist Party of Canada (CPC) and the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist–Leninist) (CPC(M‑L)) represent two very different types of Canadian Communist‑party formation, each with distinct social origins and operational dynamics. I think the CPC is something of a “red‑diaper baby” savings‑account and theatre piece: a party rooted in older left traditions, especially among Western, socially liberal Jewish and “White” Communists, which after the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1991 became more reformist and symbolic than mass‑mobilized.
It involves people who never quite could give up their Communist credentials, either out of embarrassment, lifestyle commitment, or because the government simply had something on them; and prefered to keep them around as a useful foil. Someone like a Liz Rowley falls into that category of person in Canada; the opposite however, include many embarrassed ex-Communists, such as the father of Sarah Polley, Harry Gulkin, the Montreal‑based film and theatre producer, from a Jewish family of Russian immigrants who were involved in Communist‑organizing, and later renounced communism. These are the two basic types.
In contrast, I think the CPC(M‑L) embodies a more “immigrant”-driven, cautious, risk‑averse species of Communism. It was originally led by an immigrant from South Asia, Hardial Bains, and I think it reflects a Stalinist “we never did anything wrong” posture. I think the CPC(M‑L) emerged in 1970 following student activism and the Sino-Maoist split period, and its demographic profile means it is less embedded in the older Western left milieu, less entangled with youth activism, and more conservative in personal or communal behavior, consistent with its immigrant origins.
This dynamic parallels in the United States: the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) as the “old guard” red‑diaper reflex institution, and the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) of Bob Avakian as a more ideologically rigid, outsider‑driven formation. This shows a pattern: the legacy Communist organization has institutional memory and social capital but leans reformist, socially liberal, and institutionally comfortable; the newer faction, often immigrant‑led or marginal, emphasizes ideological purity, risk avoidance, and has less penetration into broad youth activism or mainstream funding streams.
I think the structural weakness in the organized Left in these contexts comes from two related conditions: first, being too tightly defined or narrowly constituted, either as an elite legacy network or an immigrant-homogenous cadre, limits the ability to expand, adapt, and maintain a broad popular base; and second, failing to maintain connections across the broader sympathizer network or secure consistent income from that base further weakens sustainability. I think the “red diaper” institution may have culture and legacy but lacks dynamism and broad outreach, while I think the immigrant-led, Stalinist-style institution may have ideological fervor but lacks broad connectivity and funding diversity.
The CPC, founded in 1921, emphasizes a long legacy of working-class activism in Canada, while I think the CPC(M‑L), founded in 1970, built from student activism and Hardial Bains’ leadership, reflects a different social and cultural lineage. I think the notion of “red diaper baby” is important for understanding generational and inheritance dimensions in Western Communist parties.
While my analogy is compelling enough for me, it may oversimplify the messy histories of these parties: demographics, internal factionalism, local labor-movement roots, and shifting geopolitical contexts all matter. The CPC(M‑L), though more “purist” in style, is not purely immigrant-led in all respects; its activism and base are more complex than a monolithic “immigrant conservative cadre.” I think the parallel with the U.S. CPUSA versus RCP is helpful for illustration, but historical and institutional differences between Canada and the U.S. mean the analogy may not map perfectly.
Many radical parties falter when their funding, membership, or outreach cannot broaden beyond a narrow cadre base; and are thus eventually destroyed by their own Revolutionary “Apocalyptic” thinking; a Church with no forgiveness and no deviation paired with no appeal and outreach limited by their more dominant social-democratic and liberal handlers.
WHAT REALLY WERE the “Mensheviks” ANYWAY
The Mensheviks, often portrayed simply as a socialist faction opposed to Lenin’s Bolsheviks, can be understood more accurately as a 19th-century think tank.
Unlike the Bolsheviks’ vanguard model, which demanded absolute ideological discipline and prepared for imminent revolution, the Mensheviks operated through a network of small intellectuals, publications, and policy-oriented committees. Their focus was on debate, research, and strategic preparation, not on the immediate seizure of state power. In this sense, they functioned much like the modern think tanks we see today: producing ideas, training cadres, influencing public discourse, and preparing for gradual societal change.
The Mensheviks’ survival depended on discussion and intellectual engagement rather than purges or existential pressure, which is why their model is strikingly relevant to understanding how organized influence works in contexts where revolution is not imminent.
Historical experience suggests that revolutionary zeal and strict discipline can only be sustained for a limited period, roughly a decade, without concrete results. Lenin’s Bolshevik vanguard thrived in the “cusp-of-power” phase, but without the February and October Revolutions, even the reorganized Bolshevik core would likely have fragmented by 1919.
The Mensheviks, in contrast, survived because their cohesion did not rely on imminent success. Their model allowed disagreement, debate, and experimentation, which prevented internal purges and enabled the group to persist intellectually and organizationally over longer periods. This makes their approach the historical analogue of a resilient, research-driven think tank, rather than a revolutionary elite willing to burn out in pursuit of immediate victory.
In today’s entrenched democratic systems, such as the United States or Australia, as these are two examples I am thinking of specifically, attempting a Leninist vanguard strategy is impractical: there is no plausible path to sudden regime change, and attempting to enforce absolute ideological unity would only produce high turnover and public delegitimization.
Major parties control access to ballots, primary rules, campaign infrastructure, committees and endorsements. Even in systems with ranked or preferential voting ( Australia ) the long-standing Labor vs. Coalition dynamic channels bargaining, preferences, and resources in ways that keep the two main blocs dominant, which is why influence inside one of them is the fastest path to policy impact or office.
Instead, the model that works is precisely what the Mensheviks practiced: a small, focused think tank that defines 5–7 core principles, explores policy and cultural influence, and works methodically to shape ideas and networks over time. The emphasis is on long-term influence, media presence, intellectual credibility, and placement of personnel in key institutions, rather than on immediate conquest of power.
For the modern Far-Right or center-right operating in a functionally two-party system, the lesson is clear: what matters is not a vanguard or secretive faction, but a durable think tank capable of influencing culture, policy, and one party’s agenda. By emulating the Menshevik approach, establishing clear foundational principles, cultivating debate and research, and building pipelines into media and government, such a think tank can sustain influence for decades. The Mensheviks, in other words, were the right model for the wrong time; today, their approach is exactly what a political movement needs to have strategic, long-term impact within entrenched democratic institutions.
The Russian System Today
The Izborsky Club is a Russian conservative / traditionalist think-club founded in 2012 by the nationalist publicist Alexander Prokhanov; its membership lists include well-known nationalist figures such as Aleksandr Dugin and other public intellectuals tied to imperial, Orthodox and statist ideas. The club has explicitly positioned itself as a forum for patriotic, “anti-liberal” thinking and has even opened branches in contested zones like Donetsk, tying it to activist projects beyond pure scholarship.
Contrariwise, the Valdai Club, I think operates more as an acceptable centre-right funnel for ideas. It is a high-profile international discussion forum that, since the mid-2000s, has functioned under the informal patronage of the Kremlin and regularly hosts Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials at its annual meetings; it is used to broadcast and refine Russia’s foreign-policy narratives to an international expert audience. Putin has publicly acknowledged reading and citing Ivan Ilyin in Valdai-style settings, demonstrating how Valdai can serve to legitimize certain philosophical touchstones for the Kremlin elite.
This arrangement maps onto the idea that it is useful to align with at least some state messaging in order to have influence; while pushing your ideas in-stream. In practice that means: the Kremlin-linked Valdai forum and other semi-official channels can legitimate certain thinkers while keeping tighter control over the policy narrative; more radical clubs like Izborsky act as an ideological hotbed that fuses elements of Soviet statist rhetoric ( “Red” ) with monarchist / traditionalist currents ( “White” ), generating rhetorical and symbolic resources the regime can draw on when convenient.
Occasionally, the state imports ideas upward from these fringes to refresh its legitimacy. The rehabilitation of Ivan Ilyin’s monarchist nationalism, the blending of Orthodox and Soviet symbols, or the rhetoric of “traditional values” all originated in nationalist-intellectual milieus before becoming official policy language. Thus, the far right enjoys cyclical influence, when the Kremlin needs ideological intensity or moral justification, it dips into their reservoir; when that fire burns too hot, it rein’s them back.
The Virtual Non-existence of Far-Right “Think Tanks”
Richard Spencer - NPI - about 10 years a “Church.”
ARC - about 8 years as a “Church”
Fairly similar to Lenin’s tenure of his own party factions
From 2011 to 2020, Richard Spencer’s leadership of the National Policy Institute (NPI) marked the period of its most visible influence. Under his direction, NPI became the intellectual and organizational hub for the “Alt-Right,” producing conferences, publications, and speeches that drew national and international attention. Yet, despite this high profile, the institute’s reach was ultimately limited by its narrow ideological focus and dependence on a relatively small base of committed supporters.
By around 2020, NPI had largely ceased active operations, highlighting a key vulnerability for movements that rely on tightly controlled conspiratorial networks: over-concentration on a small, ideologically rigid circle can limit both resources and sustainability. This may have been part of the problem; too much prophethood and not enough simple non-apocalyptic “Presiding.”
The AltRight Corporation, active from 2017 to its legal dissolution in 2024, further illustrates this point. Although the website altright.com generated significant traffic and attention during its brief high-visibility phase in 2017–2018, the organization failed to maintain consistent engagement or diversified funding streams from the broader spectrum of right-leaning sympathizers.
By 2024, the corporation was officially inactive, emphasizing how an overly centralized or narrowly defined movement can falter when it cannot build durable networks or stable financial support across a wider base. Together, these examples suggest that one of the structural weaknesses of the contemporary organized Right, at least in this context, may be precisely the combination of ideological tightness and a failure to sustain broad connections and income streams.
The Daily Wire
I think The Daily Wire started with several significant advantages compared to cash-poor far-right organizations. First, it had substantial seed funding ( around $4.7 million ) from the beginning, which allowed it to build professional operations, hire staff, and launch a high-quality digital platform without being immediately dependent on small donors or grassroots contributions.
Second, the founders, Ben Shapiro and Jeremy Boreing, brought credibility, prior media experience, and pre-existing audiences from Shapiro’s syndicated columns, speaking engagements, and podcasting, giving them a built-in subscriber base.
Third, their location in Los Angeles and later Nashville allowed them to tap into media infrastructure and networks that smaller far-right groups couldn’t access.
Fourth, they had a sharply defined ideological brand, conservative, opinionated, and culturally resonant, which helped attract a loyal, monetizable audience. Compared to cash-strapped far-right organizations that rely on erratic donations, volunteer labor, or amateur production, The Daily Wire’s combination of capital, professional staff, and pre-built audiences gave it a structural head start and allowed it to scale quickly.
However, the company eventually faced several strategic mistakes that threatened its cohesion and growth. One was Jeremy Boreing’s decision to “kick people out” or enforce strict ideological conformity within the organization, which created internal friction and alienated talented staff. A related error was being too much of a right-wing vanguard, in which the organization emphasized extreme ideological purity, narrowing its appeal and risking internal burnout or public controversies.
Finally, The Daily Wire’s attempts at rapid diversification, moving from conservative news and podcasts into commerce, children’s programming, streaming platforms, and entertainment, I would suggest, stretched management bandwidth and diluted focus, exposing the company to operational and market risks. An argument can be made that all three factors, strict internal control, over-zealous ideological positioning, and fast diversification, combined to increase vulnerability even in an organization that started with structural advantages other far-right groups lacked.
“The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him.”
~ Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XXII (“Concerning the Secretaries of Princes”)
BUILDING A GOOD THINK TANK
A good think tank is not a miniature political party or a revolutionary cell, it’s a permanent workshop for influence. Its strength lies in balancing clarity of principle with openness of method. That means defining a short, public list of 5–7 foundational values or objectives, broad enough to unite allies, but specific enough to guide policy.
Everything beyond those principles should be treated as a field for research and debate, not public ejecting loyalty tests; any “test” is essentially written into your contract. For example, if I was Ben Shapiro, I would have said in red ink, “You must support whatever my position on Israel is to work for my company.” This would have been open, honest and clear; and that would be my recommendation for Far-Right Think Tanks and organizations going forward. The test is private and discrete, and you all know the direction you are swimming in; anything else can be a legitimate disagreement.
A think tank must produce measurable intellectual output: research papers, briefings, pilot projects, and credible data that journalists, policymakers, and academics can actually use. Its culture should encourage dissenting views, experimentation, and peer review, the antidote to ideological stagnation. I would even welcome and encourage review by people outside my Think Tank. Such as “Alt Left Analysis.” Enemies and critics would only make us stronger, as long as reach and influence was the focus.
This model, like the Mensheviks’ intellectual network of the early 20th century, survives because it converts disagreement into productivity rather than factionalism.
Durability depends on institutional design and patience. A good think tank builds its legitimacy through transparency, methodological rigor, and strategic communication. It should train and place its members, fellows, analysts, or writers, into broader institutions: media, government, academia, and business. Influence in stable democracies does not come from coups or crusades, but from embedding ideas into policy language and professional norms.
That’s why the think tank model has outlasted every vanguard party, it’s a mechanism of slow, cumulative power. The goal is to shape the framework in which future debates occur, ensuring that your principles set the boundaries of what seems “reasonable” or “possible.” In that sense, building a good think tank is not about capturing the state; it’s about teaching the state what to think.
A Think Tank for Nick Fuentes; “The Buchanan Club;” My Speculation
A serious think tank begins with a small set of publicly defensible principles that any reasonable person could support. Examples should include, promoting civic cohesion and local community life; encouraging voluntary cultural and religious associations; protecting freedom of conscience and speech; supporting democratic innovation that increases accountability; emphasizing personal responsibility and family stability; along with our non-negotiables: our “Ben Shapiro items” the things we actually want.
The language should stay within legal norms and focus on culture, citizenship, and civic problems; but it should have non-negotiables, it also has to have a wide value-proposition, which can welcome a diverse range of ideas that already exist on the Right, without any discrimination to personality types, which the more sober or introverted among us might find off-putting. Framing the work around education, heritage programs, and civic participation keeps it open to cooperation with schools, municipalities, and other NGOs; and would pair well with the thousands of more centrist and Republican think-tanks that already exist such as the Heritage Foundation. I think the American Empire needs its own version of a Izborsky Club; something that can articulate a clear nativist vision of what we want to restore and re-create; while persuading the more terrified and cowed centre-right to pick up some of our better ideas, without any cult of personality, or minor crazy ideas getting in the way. A modern John Birch Society.
